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INTRODUCTION  
 
All too often, the reputations of political thinkers mirror the fortunes of the state 
systems that invoke their names. Marxism fell out of favor as the Cold War 
wound down, replaced by liberal renderings of Hegel marketing the “end of 
history” or by postliberal alternatives ranging from antihistoricist melancholia to 
skepticism about modernity and the unipolar world order. The intellectual 
reorientation demanded by this seismic geopolitical and ideological shift also 
revived the corpses of half-forgotten figures: Carl Schmitt, the German theorist of 
the Nazi state, for example, was taken up by some leftist intellectuals for his 
evisceration of liberalism and rejection of the North American-dominated global 
status quo.1  
The enervation and ultimate dissolution of Cold War tensions also 
necessitated the search for the historical roots of the new present, calling forth a 
historiography on “imperial formations,” globalization, and memory.2 Whether 
written by postcolonial critics of the West or affirmers of the British and then the 
American role in modernizing the world, histories of empire and international 
order have been at the forefront of research agendas for a decade.3 Accordingly, 
the polarization between the West and its communist opponents has been shifted 
onto the alternative though familiar axis of the West and its non-Western others, 
the latter of course having often benefited from Soviet support, a conjuncture 
registered in 1993 by Samuel Huntington in his controversial thesis about the 
“clash of civilizations.”4 Because of these continuities, iconic anti-imperial 
thinkers like Frantz Fanon are still read, cited, and even celebrated, certainly more 
than their Western champions such as Jean-Paul Sartre.5 The archaeology of 
liberalism’s relationship to empire has attracted considerable attention for the 
same reason.6 
Shadowing this axis is the increased profile of genocide, that generic 
concept devised by another intellectual whose star has risen in the last decade, 
Raphael Lemkin. Stimulated by the terrible events in the Balkans and Rwanda in 
the 1990s, the interest in genocide likewise raises the question of America’s and 
Europe’s global role, sometimes even proclaimed duty, to prevent mass killing 
and then to keep the peace. Human rights are likewise often said to be largely a 
Western priority, if not a Western ideal, whose upholding justifies “humanitarian 
intervention” in other countries. The United Nations commitment to prevent 
genocide and protect human rights has universalized this moral imperative for the 
postwar world, augmenting the vocabulary of “civilization” and “barbarism” that 
animated the older Western-dominated international order.7 These new ideals 
have been called the fruit of “Political Knowledge after Total War, 
Totalitarianism, and the Holocaust,” a formulation which recalls that many in the 
West regard the Holocaust in particular as the threshold of ultimate transgression, 
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an icon of evil in a new, secular political imaginary that broke through after the 
Cold War.8 
Recent discussions about “American empire,” especially after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent US-led invasions of Afghanistan 
and Iraq, furnish grounds to doubt the proclaimed novelty of this political 
knowledge and the supposed “human rights revolution.”9 For this rancorous 
debate reinvoked the familiar binaries of the republican political tradition—liberty 
and empire, civilization and barbarism, virtue and corruption—the political 
semantics associated with the legacy of Rome. Indeed, whether as an inspiration 
for the United States’s global mission or as a sign of its decline and fall, the 
Roman Empire is an explicitly invoked frame of reference for numerous scholars, 
journalists, and pundits.10 Central to this reference system is the burning question 
about the legitimacy of imperial expansion in spreading “civilization”: the 
venerable problem of the relationship between violence and progress, of secular 
theodicy, of evil in history. Although this question is hardly surprising in a 
country whose founders were inspired by Rome, its contemporaneity—and the 
intensity of its disputation—is striking all the same.11 The specter of Rome has 
returned to haunt a new generation of American leaders. 
The “Western Civ” courses that thrived at US universities before and after 
the Second World War may have avoided the problem of secular theodicy by 
extolling the virtues of the country’s anticolonial liberal republicanism and 
decrying the vices of European empire—while conveniently omitting the fate of 
its indigenous peoples.12 Understandably, the relationship between violence and 
civilization exercised Jewish émigrés entering the American academy in those 
decades; for them, it was experienced with life and death urgency. Steeped in 
classical learning, they formulated answers that were often projected onto Rome 
in different ways. Leo Strauss wrote to Karl Löwith in 1933 that he was “reading 
Caesar’s Commentaries with deep understanding” and thinking of Virgil’s words 
about sparing the vanquished before declaring that Jews would be saved from 
Nazism not by liberalism but by “the spark of the Roman thought,” namely, “from 
the principles of the right, that is, from fascist, authoritarian, and imperial 
principles.” Although he went on to study Greek more than Roman thought, 
Strauss always admired Churchill and the British Empire as the negation of the 
Nazi variant.13 While the Polish-born and Palestine-based Jacob Talmon was well 
aware that Roman power had also entailed the defeat of ancient Israel, he—no 
less than Löwith, whose famous book Meaning in History is littered with 
references to Rome’s genocidal excesses—thought the empire at least had 
guaranteed Jews’ equal legal status, unlike the tribal nations to the north.14 No 
such understanding was forthcoming from their French contemporary, Simone 
Weil, who suggested just before her death in 1943 that the pagan Roman Empire 
lived on in Nazi expansionism, as it had in the Spanish and British empires; she 
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contended that all of them were run by rootless adventurers who “exterminated or 
reduced to servitude all the peoples of Palestine” (in the Roman case) or 
“massacred or enslaved coloured peoples” (in the Spanish and British cases).15  
This long-term recuperation of the distant European past for present 
purposes was identified in 1946 by fellow German (though non-Jewish) émigré 
Eric Voegelin as a manifestation of das römische Gespräch—which he translated 
as “the Roman debate”—that he said had been underway in the West since the 
eighteenth century. Das römische Gespräch   is perhaps better rendered as “the 
Roman discussion,” connoting a political language or discourse. Its origins, wrote 
Voegelin, lay in the western European states’ rupture with Christianity and 
Roman traditions, which, ironically, compelled commentators to assess the new 
states’ fate against the cautionary example of Rome’s demise: henceforth, “the 
Roman debate becomes one of the most important instruments for this critique of 
the age, with the implication that in the decline of Rome we find the forces at 
work which also determine the decline of the West.” Spengler and Toynbee, 
declared Voegelin, stood in a tradition of pessimistic reflection stretching back to 
“Vico and Montesquieu, Ferguson and Gibbon, Niebuhr and Mommsen, Edward 
Meyer and Rostoftzeff.”16 To this list one might add an impressive cast of 
nineteenth-century British thinkers who agonized over the question of whether 
Greece or Rome was their empire’s appropriate ancestor and model.17 
That das römische Gespräch is by no means an arcane discussion confined 
to the academy is indicated, as we have noted, by the contemporary debate about 
American empire, in which Leo Strauss and his followers have been accused of 
virtually urging the adoption of “fascist, authoritarian, and imperial principles” at 
the expense of the republic’s liberties.18 Non-Americans also participate in the 
debate when they depict the United States either as a rapacious oppressor of 
smaller peoples, in the manner of Weil, or, like Talmon, as a beacon of tolerance 
and law that benevolently bestows cosmopolitan civilization on ethnocentric 
smaller nations. Whatever the view, the compulsion to analogize with Rome—das 
römische Gespräch—continues as never before. 
This is a context in which Hannah Arendt’s work can be profitably 
studied. Hailed once again as a thinker for our “dark times” in offering guidance 
on all manner of pressing issues, her star shines in the firmament.19 While she has 
long been regarded as a champion of Greek thought who advocated the polis as 
the antidote to modernity’s corrosions—a reading based foremost on her book 
The Human Condition—Arendt’s broader oeuvre also reveals a preoccupation 
with the republican lineage that crystallized in ancient Rome.20 She was familiar 
with Roman sources not only from her grammar school education and dissertation 
on Augustine (1929)—“an extraordinary tradition of Roman thought still lived on 
in him,” she wrote later—but also because the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
authors she read were steeped in the tradition.21 Thus, in addition to routinely 
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citing the Roman writers Cato, Cicero, Livy, and Tacitus and later commentators 
like Machiavelli, James Harrington, and Montesquieu, she extensively invoked 
figures such as Edmund Burke, J. R. Seeley, J. A. Froude, and John A. Hobson, 
whose characteristically republican analyses of empire formed the basis of the 
large section on imperialism in her Origins of Totalitarianism.22 While she never 
referred to Edward Gibbon’s eighteenth-century classic, his The Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire and many other books on Roman history lined her library 
shelves.23  
It was no coincidence that Arendt was indebted to the legacy of Florentine 
civic humanism from “Machiavelli to Hume.”24 Das römische Gespräch 
contained a “linguistic inventory” of what Reinhart Koselleck called “basic 
historical concepts” (Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe), whose remarkable stability 
“semantically preprogrammed” her historical perception.25 A rich tradition, 
Roman republicanism offered her a variety of positions on questions of war, 
conquest, and reason of state (raison d’état), and she drew on them both explicitly 
and implicitly. Accordingly, the fall of the Roman Empire provided the negative 
template for contemporary understanding: “What already happened once in our 
history, in the centuries of the declining Roman Empire,” she declared, “may be 
happening again today” to the West.26 The weakness of the republican tradition, 
she implied in 1945, had rendered Germany vulnerable to Nazism: “Hardly 
another country of Occidental culture was so little imbued with the classic virtues 
of civic behavior.”27 Like Viscount Bolingbroke in the eighteenth century and 
Machiavelli before him, Arendt wished to rescue the polity from historical change 
by reviving republican virtues and political forms.28   
In what follows, my aim is less to reconstruct Arendt’s debt to this 
tradition for its own sake than to demonstrate the limitations of the civilizational 
ideal and its countenance of violent expansion. For while Roman writers often 
criticized this expansionism, or at least its mode, they tended to conserve and 
honor Roman traditions in the face of perceived decline or crisis; their 
reservations may have established some norms in the conduct of war but never 
challenged the rationale of the empire, whose expansion was necessarily violent. 
Arendt was no different—and neither, in effect, are those who invoke her without 
realizing the assumptions on which she relied. Thus the critique evident in her 
work in the first half of the 1940s, when she was inspired by the antifascist 
resistance to Hitler, became blunted by her anxiety about the Soviet threat to “the 
West,” a term she used uncritically to connote a political tradition and community 
of values.29 Whereas she had originally planned to write solely about Nazism as 
“race imperialism,” by 1947 she had decided to invoke the generic concept of 
totalitarianism in order to include the Soviet Union in her expanded analysis.30 In 
1945, she declared fascism to be the “arch-evil of our time” and its “roots” to be 
“Anti-Semitism, Racism, Imperialism”: in 1951, these same three elements were 
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transformed into the “origins of totalitarianism,” with racism folded into the 
section on imperialism and a new section added on totalitarian movements and 
rule.31 And so the concern with genocide (though she hardly used the term) 
evident in her articles in the mid-1940s was replaced in Origins by concern with 
the emblem of “the camp” and the “total domination” that she thought was 
totalitarianism’s diabolical project: it destroyed a rather abstract notion of “human 
spontaneity” rather than concrete human lives.32 Similarly, she never warmed to 
anticolonial national liberation movements in the 1960s, although earlier she had 
hoped that political Zionism would ally itself with other oppressed peoples rather 
than with imperial powers.33  
In following this trajectory, Arendt was typical of many former leftists 
among New York intellectuals, like her friend Dwight Macdonald, who, after 
appraising Soviet society, “chose the West” to combat “evil,”34 or her fellow 
central European émigré scholar, Hans Kohn, who advocated a “New West.”35 
Indeed, “Western civilization,” a term with a nineteenth-century pedigree, became 
the glue of the anti-communist alliance.36 Thus the British Foreign Office sought 
to convince Americans of the distinction between the British Labour Party’s 
socialism and Soviet communism by proposing “a sort of spiritual union of the 
West,” as Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin put it.37 British officials also shared 
Arendt’s attraction to federations and commonwealths—inspired by Bundism, she 
had earlier admired the Soviet Union as a federative alternative to the assimilation 
of the interwar homogeneous nation-state—as models for post-imperialist global 
order: they would protect minorities but also ensure white rule in Central Africa.38 
Like Strauss, she regarded England and its empire as “the last bulwark against the 
new barbarism” of Nazism. The British Commonwealth and the United States, 
she wrote in 1940, portended a postwar “commonwealth of European nations with 
a parliament of its own,” although by 1946 she realized that the homogenous 
nation-state had survived the war and would not easily yield to federative 
incorporation.39 It was hardly coincidental that Arendt’s employer between 1963 
and 1967, the University of Chicago’s Committee on Social Thought, commenced 
business in 1941 as the “Committee on the Study of Civilization.”40 
While embedding Arendt further in these contexts is a legitimate scholarly 
undertaking, it is not the purpose of this article.41 Instead, this essay presents a 
detailed analysis of her thought so that the inner structure and full implications of 
the contemporary römische Gespräch can be better appreciated. These can be 
easily summarized. To revive rather than reject the civilization that produced 
fascism and the Holocaust, Arendt embraced an ideology of civilization modeled 
on the Roman republic and justified through its progressive incorporation of 
diverse peoples into a federated international order. She did so despite her 
ostensible skepticism about philosophies of history and theories of progress. 
Rome’s mythic foundation in colonial conquest and settlement and its spread of 
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civilization by violent expansion was, she thought, an acceptable, indeed 
necessary theodicy that could be distinguished from modern imperialism. Her 
fierce criticism of the latter and hypothesis that it was one of the “origins of 
totalitarianism” has obscured her fundamental approval of empire building over 
the millennia.42 Consequently, Arendt could not bring herself to blame the 
tradition for the origins of the genocide that she wished to prevent. While she was 
well aware that European colonists eliminated the indigenous peoples who stood 
in their way, she did not invest these genocides with any significance, an 
insensitivity that can be also attributed to her anti-“primitivism” and qualified 
sympathy for the Roman traditions of just war and reason of state.43 It was fitting 
that the Danish government awarded her the Sonning Prize for Contributions to 
European Civilization just before her death in 1975.44 
For all this apologetic affirmation of the West, however, Arendt never 
became a conservative culture warrior. Her republican commitment led to insights 
as well as to blindnesses. While her initial enthusiasm for the Zionist project in 
Palestine was a product of this tradition, so was her later withering criticism of 
Zionism in action. No friend of militarism, she also invoked the “boomerang 
effect”— “the unexpected ruinous backfiring of evil deeds on the doer, of which 
imperialist politicians of former generations were so afraid”—to excoriate US 
domestic and foreign policy.45 The ancient trope of imperial corruption and 
decline, then, was a powerful source of critique, and for such critiques she is 
hallowed today.  
But is this an adequate foundation for preventing genocide and protecting 
human rights, as supposed by many commentators? Far from being empowered 
by what Arendt called “the Roman trinity of religion, authority, and tradition,”46 
there are good reasons to think that genocide prevention and human rights are 
imperiled by the concomitant trinity of savagery-barbarism-civilization to which 
she subscribed—as many do today. In the end, I argue, Arendt’s fealty to the 
republican tradition led her to betray the principle of plurality—her proclaimed 
antigenocidal ideal—because the civilizational ideal implied the unassimilable 
alterity of those people deemed savage or barbaric. The cost of uncritically taking 
up these Roman categories of thought was and is to tolerate, even justify, the 
violent excesses that logically flowed from their application. The Holocaust, in 
particular, could only be integrated into her account of the West by severing it 
from the history of Western expansion, beginning with Rome. Understanding this 
debt is the relevance of studying Arendt today, for her nuanced elaboration and 
updating of the republican tradition reveals its implications in a globalized world 
of American empire, thereby placing in historical perspective contemporary 
discussions about genocide and the justifications of war in the name of 
civilization.47  
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We know that das römische Gespräch came into being because of a 
previous rupture; its function was to bridge that rupture. Arendt’s römische 
Gespräch in “a new key” was her continuation of the conversation in 
unprecedented conditions: the world-historical novum of a “global, universally 
interrelated civilization” and the rupture of Western political and intellectual 
traditions that at once led to and were represented by totalitarianism. The past, she 
wrote, could not be transmitted because it had become “fragmented”; neither did a 
shared reality or experience—indeed, a world—any longer exist to which appeal 
could be made.48 In many ways, she was responding to the late nineteenth-century 
illiberal political culture of mass society and ethnonationalism that Carl E. 
Schorske identified in these pages as “politics in a new key.”49 This is the style of 
politics she decried in the suggestive imagery with which she began her Origins: 
“The subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface and 
usurped the dignity of our tradition”—imagery likely taken from Goethe, who 
registered how “our moral and political world is undermined with subterranean 
roads, cellars, and sewers.”50 It was her aim to restore the tradition’s dignity after 
its rupture. The dismissal of Arendt as less a loyal republican thinker than a 
dangerous Heideggerian existentialist is therefore misguided.  The appellations 
are not mutually exclusive in the circumstances: she was rethinking that tradition 
in conditions of crisis and rupture—“in a new key.”51  
This argument is elaborated in five steps. After outlining Arendt’s debt to 
Rome and her justification of its expansion, it proceeds in the next two sections to 
highlight her inability to manage genocidal settler violence and the consequently 
limited scope of her much-vaunted critique of imperialism. On that basis it then 
analyzes Arendt’s controversial views on Zionism, laying bare her enduring 
commitment to the settler colonial projects that she thought spread civilization. 
The final section examines how she integrated the Holocaust into a defense of 
Western civilization by recourse to republican notions of reason of state. The 
article concludes by revisiting the contemporary römische Gespräch and 
questioning Arendt’s usefulness as a thinker for our times.  
 
ROME AND THE SPREAD OF CIVILIZATION 
Consumed with anxiety about the fate of liberty, Arendt wrote with sword drawn 
to prevent totalitarianism from enveloping the remnants of the political tradition 
she identified as the only source of resistance: Roman republicanism, whose last 
home she sometimes called “the Atlantic community,” that is, the Western 
European nation-states and above all the United States.52 The United States won 
her loyalty because, as she wrote in 1943, it “has come very close to the same 
conception” as the multinational Soviet one she had admired. Given the Jewish 
experience of persecution, the fact that the US state did not try to assimilate or 
expel minorities was of signal importance; it “is not only the government of 
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united states but of united peoples as well.”53 America respected cultural 
pluralism. Her admiration increased over time. In 1970, after Arendt had lived in 
the country for decades and closely studied its political history, she hoped that the 
North American “traditional instruments for facing the future”—the civic power 
of the “Mayflower compact” and “voluntary associations”—might help it 
confront “the great turmoil of change and of failure through which it is going at 
the present.”54 As we will see, the destruction of political federations based on 
compacts and covenants, which she thought were pioneered by Roman expansion, 
lay at the heart of the totalitarian menace.   
What were the origins of this menace? The key is Arendt’s conception of 
Western history. Dispersed in passages and asides as if readers were assumed to 
be familiar with the background drama, her views are not set out systematically 
but are clear all the same. The viva acta of Roman political life was based on the 
work that creates permanent things for worldly immortality (homo faber) rather 
than the labor necessary for physical reproduction (animal laborans). Arendt does 
not elaborate on Rome’s fall but notes that it was accompanied by the 
“worldlessness” of Christianity and by Greek philosophy’s theoretical 
comportment to reality, problems she saw recurring in her own day.55 Thereafter, 
the West was plunged into darkness. The Roman tradition was recovered—or, 
rather, rearticulated intellectually—in the Renaissance and manifested politically 
in the Atlantic revolutions of the late eighteenth century, that is, in the foundation 
of the French and American republics. These new states “were not only enacted, 
as Marx said, in Roman clothes,” she observed, “but also actually revived the 
fundamental contribution of Rome to Western history”; indeed, they “appear like 
gigantic attempts to repair those foundations, to renew the broken thread of 
tradition, and to restore, through founding new political bodies, what for so many 
centuries had endowed the affairs of men with some measure of dignity and 
greatness.”56 The “enormous pathos” generated by these foundations—a pathos 
Arendt seemed to share—she attributed to the experience of freedom, “man’s 
capacity for novelty,” especially after “the centuries which separate the downfall 
of the Roman Empire from the rise of the modern age.”57 Paradoxically, then, 
such revolutions were not ruptures with tradition but “the only salvation which 
this Roman-Western tradition has provided for emergencies,” because the past 
was the source of inspiration.58 
Founding a state instantiated republican traditions of political self-rule, 
although Arendt always opposed the state’s sovereign claim as inimical to human 
plurality. However imperfect their constitutions, states acted as residual 
containers of a tradition that was threatened by the economically driven imperial 
expansion of the late nineteenth century. The imperialism manifested so 
spectacularly in the “scramble for Africa” in the mid-1880s represented for her 
“an almost complete break in the continuous flow of Western history as we had 
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known it for more than two thousand years.”59 The rot had set in earlier, in the 
seventeenth century—the beginning of the “modern age,” just before the Atlantic 
revolutions—when Western elites began to believe in limitless progress instead of 
remembering the tradition’s sacred foundation in Rome. This new temporal 
orientation fatally ruptured the trinity of religion-authority-tradition and its 
“common sense” standards of politics, ethics, and morality, an analysis she shared 
with Voegelin.60 The twentieth-century totalitarian catastrophes ensued from this 
rupture. Even the United States, the product of the most successful republican 
revolution, was threatened by the “worldlessness” of a self-automated, global 
economic system beyond human control. Limitless expansion for its own sake, 
represented by imperialism and capitalism, was the enemy of the limited political 
order that provided a worldly home for humans. It attacked their freedom.  
This process was, so to speak, the “external” enemy of the nation-state. Its 
internal decay was initiated when an ethnically conceived nation began to conquer 
the state, as Arendt observed in Europe between the wars; that is, it started with 
“the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument 
of the nation,” the concomitant discrimination against minorities, the production 
of refugees, and the destruction of the political sphere.61 Initially writing before 
the wave of decolonization in the early 1960s, Arendt saw the nation-state as the 
victim rather than victor of modern history. How to rescue republicanism after the 
sovereign nation–state had run its course as a political form?62 
To save the West in its emergency meant reconstructing the Roman 
political experience that, Arendt maintained, had never been satisfactorily 
registered in Western political thought. She was to perform this task. Several 
features of the Roman republic and empire needed highlighting to remedy the 
defects of the Western tradition’s Greek, Jewish, and Christian dimensions. The 
“political genius of Rome,” she wrote in The Human Condition, was “legislation 
and foundation.” Elsewhere, she added “the preservation of a civitas.”63 State 
foundations, their worship in sacred memory, and the rule of law constituted this 
Roman political experience. Each element was a building block in the justification 
for the Roman expansion she supported. 
The first element, then, was the myth of Rome’s foundation as recounted 
by Virgil in his epic poem, Aeneid.  Following centuries of commentary on the 
relevance of Virgil’s poetry for contemporary empire, Arendt regarded the 
occurrences recounted there as  “among the most remarkable and amazing events 
in Western history.”64 This poem about the foundation of Rome by the survivors 
of Troy’s destruction was, for her, a lesson in human freedom—beginning a new 
polity “without the help of a transcendent God”65—which is why it held such 
fascination for the men of the American revolution. By sourcing Rome’s origins 
in Troy rather than in the fratricidal violence of Romulus, Virgil obviated the 
problem associated with an “absolute new beginning,” namely, that its “complete 
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arbitrariness” and “abyss of pure spontaneity” contained the potential for virtually 
limitless violence. The utopianism and search for a “new absolute” characteristic 
of a Robespierre, which she associated with Plato, threatened terror unless safely 
institutionalized by inserting revolutionary moments into a historical continuum. 
Citing Harrington, she noted that “men of action, driven by the momentum of the 
liberation process … ransacked the archive of ‘ancient prudence’ to guide them in 
the establishment of a Republic.” Successful revolutionary foundations, then, 
were establishments not of “a new Rome” but of “Rome anew”: foundations were 
renewals (erneute Gründung).66 
Arendt was aware that the arrival of the Trojans and establishment of a 
new Troy entailed bloodshed, namely, war with “the native Italians.” Victory was 
justified, she implied, following Virgil, because the indigenous Italian farmers 
were pre-political, inhabiting a “utopian fairy-tale land outside of history,” bereft 
of laws, closer to nature than to human society, a people “whose circling years 
produce no tales worth telling.”67 As we will see, these are the terms in which 
Arendt elsewhere described indigenous victims of settler colonialism who “live 
and die without leaving any trace, without having contributed anything to the 
common world.” In contemporary parlance, they represented “bare life” or, as 
Arendt presciently expressed the condition of refugees, “the abstract nakedness of 
being nothing but human.”68 
Her sympathies lay with the Trojans who were civilizing the natives by 
founding a political community with a temporal sense of origins: “Action, in so 
far as it engages in founding and preserving political bodies, creates the condition 
for remembrance, that is, for history,” and thereby imposes “a measure of 
permanence and durability upon the futility of mortal life and the fleeting 
character of human time.”69 What is more, they introduced settled agricultural 
communities and inaugurated the Roman ideal of the self-sufficient and patriotic 
farmer praised by Cato, one of Arendt’s favorite Roman authors, and by Victorian 
writers millennia later. Little wonder that the literary scholar Richard Waswo calls 
Virgil’s Aeneid “the founding legend of Western civilization”: that civilization is 
spread by imperial conquest and settlement and justified by appeals to the cultural 
superiority of the colonists—exiles and migrants—with their settled agriculture 
over the autochthonous with their bare life.70 Like most Europeans at the time, 
Arendt assumed such superiority, because Roman expansion entailed the spread 
of liberty, which was sufficient justification for war.  
To be sure, Arendt was wary of the Roman just war tradition in modern 
conditions, because technology meant that war could potentially destroy humanity 
in nuclear conflagrations.71 But she had no illusions about the legitimacy of past 
declarations of war. Quoting Livy, she observed that just wars and necessity—that 
is, self-defense—were synonymous.72 Rome’s belief that its opponents violated 
those military norms that it observed was at the root of its self-serving “sense of 
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moral superiority in war,” as one scholar has put it.73 Its violence was justifiable. 
Even so, Arendt admired the accompanying Roman belief in the universal validity 
of the law and maintenance of peace, as expressed, for instance, by Cicero in De 
Re Publica, which we know she studied closely. Arendt stands at the end of a 
lineage that commenced with Cicero and was developed by the Renaissance 
humanists and early modern thinkers like Grotius who defended empire in these 
terms.74 What John Pocock observed of Edward Gibbon applies equally to 
Arendt: “The liberty that mattered was the self-destructive liberty of empire-
builders; that the Romans were depriving Spaniards, Gauls, Batavians and Britons 
of their liberty was recognized, but this had been no more than the warlike 
independence of barbarous peoples, not the complex and law-governed liberty of 
republican citizens.”75   
The mythic quality of this “plot” (Waswo) also lay in the outcome of the 
war between the Trojans and the natives. Arendt celebrated the fact that the 
outcome was not “victory and departure for one side, extermination and slavery 
and utter destruction for the others”; rather (citing Virgil), “‘both nations, 
unconquered, join treaty forever under equal laws’ and settle down together.” 
That is, they signed a treaty, blended in intermarriage to become a new people, 
and averted genocide due to Roman law and its conception of limited warfare, 
“that unique and great notion of a war whose peace is pre-determined not by 
victory or defeat but by an alliance of the warring parties, who now become 
partners, socii or allies, by virtue of the new relationship established in the fight 
itself and confirmed through the instrument of lex, the Roman law.”76 Arendt was 
excited by this “genius of Roman politics” in subjecting the world to this law, 
which united peoples while preserving the distinctiveness of subidentities, unlike 
modern nation–states that tended “to assimilate rather than integrate”—for 
incorporation into the Roman Empire entailed less occupation and cultural erasure 
than ties of friendship on the basis of legal equality, even if they were de facto 
asymmetrical.77 However rosy an interpretation of Roman conquest this view may 
have been, the point is how she construed this past for the future she wanted to 
imagine. “Rome,” she noted in her Denktagebuch in May 1953, “[was] the first 
city that was founded on laws.”78 Arendt was saying that this legendary 
foundation inaugurated the first antigenocidal principle, namely, that treaties and 
federation replaced “wars of annihilation,” as she called them, thereby drawing 
former enemies into a common world.79  “What happened when the descendants 
of Troy arrived on Italian soil was no more and no less than the growth of politics 
in the very place where it had reached its limits and come to an end among the 
Greeks. With the Romans, politics grew not between citizens of equal rank within 
a city, but rather between alien and unequally matched people who first came 
together in battle.”80  
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The Romans realized that forgiveness—or least sparing the conquered—
was a political virtue, “a wisdom entirely unknown to the Greeks.”81 The 
expansion facilitated by this form of forgiveness marked “the beginning of the 
Western World”—indeed, it first “created the Western world as world,” because 
barbarian societies, which were by definition “worldless,” were conjoined to the 
Roman one, producing a new reality they henceforth shared.82 Although she did 
not make the link explicit, it is possible to see Arendt’s Kantian notion of 
judgment as an “enlarged mentality” to be predicated on an imperial logic of 
expansion, because assessing the viewpoints of others depended on a pluralism 
achieved by the civilizational incorporation of the other; this process enabled the 
“world” that facilitated the imaginative capacity—the very faculty that she said 
Adolf Eichmann lacked. If liberty required expansion, as Machiavelli taught, then 
so did pluralism.83 The enemy of both, therefore, was ethnocentrism.  
Of course, Arendt knew that the colonizing tradition originated in the 
Greek polis. Quoting the maxim of Greek political culture, she wrote: “‘Wherever 
you go, you will be a polis’: these famous words became not merely the 
watchword of Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that action and 
speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location 
almost any time and anywhere.”84 The polis was a transplantable proposition in 
time and space. We will see that this ancient colonization was of a piece for 
Arendt with the spread of the Anglophone settler colonies and Zionist 
colonization of Palestine in the first half of the twentieth century.  
For all that, she thought the Greek example was insufficient because the 
polis’s ethnocentric self-absorption and radical independence made empire 
building all but impossible. The scattered poleis did not cohere into a greater 
whole; they constituted mini-worlds rather than expanding the frontiers of 
civilization. The genius of Rome, we recall, was the incorporation of the 
colonization impulse into a once-and-for-all foundation of a polity. The memory 
of this foundation then congealed into a religious cult of tradition that Arendt 
prized as the glue that held together the civitas.85  
This idealized view of Roman expansion as a federation that avoided 
genocide may have been taken from James Harrington’s The Commonwealth of 
Oceana (1656) and his notion of “unequal leagues” (itself derived from Cicero), 
upon which Arendt drew in On Revolution.86 And as Machiavelli, whom she also 
admired, had contended in his Discorsi, Rome expanded most efficiently by 
establishing leagues of confederacy. Here was the not so “new political principle” 
of unity-yet-diversity she had announced as the savior of the West at the 
beginning of the Origins. If, as Arendt wrote, all foundations, including 
conquests, entailed violence and violation—“the old legendary crime (Romulus 
slew Remus, Cain slew Abel)”—they were redeemed by their transformation into 
a society of law that “preserved different realms of being.”87 Machiavelli enjoyed 
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her qualified admiration because he rearticulated the Roman political experience 
of foundation and understood that revolutions inevitably entailed violence.88  
 
THE LIMITS TO THE LIMITS ON VIOLENCE 
While Arendt appreciated that violations marked virtually all political 
foundations, the point of the Aeneid myth was to secure the stability of the polity 
by concealing its bloody origins or at least legitimizing its violent conquests as 
acts of self-defense, extensions of freedom, and impositions of the rule of law 
over barbarous peoples. How, after all, could a state thrive if its foundation was 
thought criminal? Like Virgil, Arendt knew that since Western civilization 
usually spread by conquest, violence was almost invariably necessary for its 
expansion. The “colonization of America and Australia,” for example, “was 
accompanied by comparatively short periods of cruel liquidation because of the 
natives’ numerical weakness.”89 In the Origins, she wrote: “There have almost 
always been wars of aggression; the massacre of hostile populations after a 
victory went unchecked until the Romans mitigated it by introducing parcere 
subjectis; through centuries the extermination of native peoples went hand in hand 
with the colonization of the Americas, Australia and Africa; slavery is one of the 
oldest institutions of mankind and all empires of antiquity were based on the labor 
of state-owned slaves who erected their public buildings.”90 
Her admission that treaties were not signed with indigenous peoples, who 
were so often exterminated, undermines her case about the emollient effects of the 
Roman way of war. In fact, such extermination was built into its assumptions, as 
she effectively conceded when she wrote of “those isolated tribes who were 
vegetating their lives away when first discovered on new continents by European 
explorers, tribes that the Europeans then either drew into the human world or 
eradicated without ever being aware that they too were human beings.”91 While 
the Aeneid myth metaphorically reversed Troy’s annihilation by positing the 
Roman people as the union of Trojans and indigenous locals, thereby setting 
human survival at the core of the Western tradition, it did so at the cost of 
establishing a threshold of the human and a standard of civilization in whose 
name peoples not regarded as fully human and civilized could be dispossessed 
and annihilated. The limits to her pluralism were all too apparent in her readiness 
to accept this price of Western expansion. She was opposed not to civilizational 
progress but only to “the nineteenth century belief of unlimited progress.”92 
If Arendt expressed few scruples about such violence, she did not have 
many scruples regarding human inequality either. The “persecution of powerless 
or power-losing groups may not be a very pleasant spectacle,” she observed, “but 
it does not spring from human meanness alone.” Power and inequality were not 
irrational if socially functional. “Even exploitation and oppression still make 
society work and establish some kind of order.”93 Her defense of European 
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empires’ violence and exploitation was based on their utilitarian nature and 
instrumental aims, namely, founding and protecting a circumscribed political 
order. Violence was ultimately limited, an attribute that distinguished those 
empires from the limitless, antipolitical expansionism of modern imperialism and 
totalitarianism.94 
Arendt justified European settler colonialism over the centuries on the basis 
of these assumptions. And she therefore took pains to distinguish legitimate 
empire building—establishing settler colonial societies—from the illegitimate 
imperialism of the late nineteenth century.  
Imperialism is not empire-building and expansion is not 
conquest. The imperial passion, old as history, time and 
again, has spread culture and law to the four corners of the 
world. The conqueror wanted nothing but spoils and would 
leave the country after the looting; or he wanted to stay 
permanently and would then incorporate the conquered 
territory into the body politic and gradually assimilate the 
conquered population to the standard of the mother 
country. This type of conquest has led to all kinds of 
political structures—to empires in the more distant and to 
nations in the more recent past. At any rate, conquest was 
but the first step towards preparing a more permanent 
political structure.95 
Indeed, we recall, for Arendt the establishment of permanent political structures, 
with her assumptions about the viva acta and homo faber, was the paramount 
precondition for fully human life. We also know Arendt thought that the failure to 
fabricate such a human world entailed “worldlessness” and, consistent with this 
perspective, she regarded the long tradition of Jewish isolation from politics as “a 
form of barbarism.”96 The analysis also applied to concentration camp inmates, 
outcasts as they were from their polities: “they were regarded as savages and, 
afraid that they might end up by being considered beasts, they insisted on their 
nationality … as their only remaining and recognized tie with humanity.”97 The 
chauvinist, smaller Slavic peoples attempting to form nation-states after the 
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were similarly alienated from “the old 
trinity of people–territory–state,” comprising “masses … who had not the 
slightest idea of the meaning of patria, not the vaguest notion of the responsibility 
of a common limited community and no experience of political freedom.”98 Her 
much-cited description of Israeli Mizrahim protesting at the Eichmann trials as an 
“oriental mob, as if one were in Istanbul or some other half-Asiatic country”—
mob being her choice term for the worldless rabble—expressed this belief as 
well.99   
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It was not as if she completely ignored the indigenous perspective. Tacitus 
provided the imputed view of the victim of Roman conquest when he composed 
this classic address for the British leader Calgacus in his Agricola: “Robbers of 
the world, having by their universal plunder exhausted the land, they rifle the 
deep. If the enemy be rich, they are rapacious; if he be poor, they lust for 
domination; neither the east nor the west has been able to satisfy them. Alone 
among men they covet with equal eagerness poverty and riches. To robbery, 
slaughter, plunder, they give the lying name of empire; they make a solitude and 
call it peace.”100 
From this famous quotation, Arendt drew the conclusion that Roman 
commentators were superior to modern ones because they at least acknowledged 
“the side of the defeated as defeated.” Nothing more could be expected from the 
Romans, whose horizon excluded “some other absolutely different entity equal to 
Rome in greatness and thus worthy of being remembered in history.” But if she 
disapproved of this “limitation,” it did not affect her broader views: she adopted 
the victor’s perspective throughout—unlike, say, Simone Weil, who identified 
with the indigenous victims.101 Not for Arendt Rudyard Kipling’s consciousness 
of empire’s costs in his famous phrase about “savage wars of peace.” 
Arendt was able to entertain such notions about empire by consigning to a 
footnote the apparently atypical case of the Belgian Congo, whose conquest she 
knew had cost tens of millions of lives, and excusing the large-scale massacres as 
instrumentally limited actions.102 Ultimately, she did not think that the Romans 
and, later, the Europeans, were aggressors. Indeed, her reliance on Theodor 
Mommsen’s History of Rome suggests she was influenced by the theory of 
“defensive imperialism”—the accretive acquisition of empire by confronting 
perceived external threats rather than by premeditated aggression—which was 
popular among the ancient Roman apologists as well as in her day.103 This view 
was consistent with her subscription to the Aeneid myth that, since Vitoria, had 
justified European expansion by reference to posited norms of hospitality and 
commerce that coded indigenous resistance as aggression and European violence 
as self-defense.104 
 
THE “BOOMERANG EFFECT” AND THE CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM   
We stated at the outset that Arendt’s fealty to the republican tradition did not 
entail blind affirmation of Western civilization. It was also a source of limited if 
trenchant critique. That the “boomerang” thesis can be traced back to authors such 
as John A. Hobson has been noted, but its sources lie much further back with 
Roman writers like Sallust, author of “the first decline and fall,” who decried the 
corruptions of the republic by imperial expansion.105 Arendt’s major sources on 
late nineteenth-century imperialism were Charles Dilke’s Greater Britain (1868); 
J. R. Froude’s Oceania (1886), named after Harrington’s book of the same title; J. 
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R. Seeley’s The Expansion of England (1883); and, of course, Hobson’s 
Imperialism (1902), whose categories were in part indebted to earlier Victorian 
critics like Richard Cobden.106 It is therefore worth briefly recalling their views.  
Cobden (1804-65) and others a generation before him had voiced the 
traditional republican concern that imperial rule corrupted the domestic polity in a 
number of ways: governing foreigners entailed imposing despotism abroad and 
promoting the social power of military and other elites in England; adventurers 
corroded domestic political culture when they returned.107 Such critics tended to 
value the virtues they perceived among settler colonists, looking to Greece rather 
than Rome as their model. Settlement, not conquest, was their ideal. At the same 
time, they noted the ever-present danger that settlers might be corrupted by their 
savage environment.108  
Later Victorians like Seeley and Froude became haunted by the prospect 
of imperial decline and fall, as rival German and other empires challenged British 
hegemony. Accordingly, they sought alternatives to the pessimistic narratives 
offered by Sallust and Polybius. Sallust, in particular, was a confounding prophet 
because his account portrayed imperial decline as a product of the same kind of 
“republican” freedom and imperial success enjoyed by Great Britain: the 
attainment of independence and liberty led to the pursuit of glory and expansion 
that in turn heralded corruption. Rome’s destruction of Carthage, argued Sallust, 
meant the elimination of its last existential threat, yet the removal of that threat 
also eliminated the guarantee that public-spirited virtue would prevail over 
privately oriented ambition.109 Machiavelli took up these insights in his 
commentary on imperial rule over conquered provinces; the military commander 
ruled there without checks and balances, unlike the magistrate in the core 
territories, thereby turning what should be an exercise of public power into an 
extension of the private realm. Only in the free and competitive interplay of 
institutions and opinion could virtue be guaranteed.110 
John Hobson congealed these ideas in his famous critique, Imperialism, 
Arendt’s main source of inspiration for her own views on the subject. No less than 
his predecessors, he distinguished between empires—effectively settler 
colonialism—and imperialism. The former was “a genuine expansion of 
nationality, a territorial enlargement of the stock, language and institutions of the 
nation” through migrants’ foundation of polities whose inhabitants would enjoy 
either full British citizenship or “local self-government in close conformity with 
her institutions.” Imperialism, by contrast, was a “debasement of genuine 
nationalism” because it entailed the “complete political bondage” of conquered 
subjects.111 True empire, he continued, was epitomized by “the so-called Pax 
Romana,” namely, “a federation of States, under a hegemony, covering in general 
terms the entire known or recognized world.” The novelty of contemporary 
imperialism was the “cut-throat struggle of competing empires” with deleterious 
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effects.112 In the British case, he complained, its “despotism” in India and Africa 
had outstripped the “progress in population and practical freedom attained by our 
few democratic colonies” in settler colonies like Australia.113 
Hobson spared no criticism of imperial rule. Pax Britannica, once “an 
impudent falsehood,” was now “a grotesque monster of hypocrisy” because 
imperialism was “aggression against lower races.” At home, government policy 
was increasingly determined by “financial juntos,” by which he meant that 
commercially minded politicians used public resources to advance private 
business interests. Worse still, further resources were devoted to the army and 
navy as militarism moved to the “forefront of practical politics.” Using the 
language of republicanism, he complained that these developments struck “at the 
very root of popular liberty and the ordinary civic virtues.”114  
The boomerang effect manifested itself in the stimulation of “autocratic 
government” at home due to the increased secrecy of the executive and decline of 
popular control. Those ruling the “natives” in situ were damaged as well by 
“feeding habits of snobbish subservience, the admiration of wealth and rank, the 
corrupt survivals of the inequalities of feudalism.” Cecil Rhodes was a typical 
figure “whose character has been formed in our despotic Empire.” In sum: “It is, 
indeed, a nemesis of Imperialism that the arts and crafts of tyranny, acquired and 
exercised in our unfree Empire, should be turned against our liberties at home.”115  
Arendt took up all these points: the distinction between legitimate Roman-
style empire and late nineteenth-century imperialism; the British emulation of the 
Greeks in expanding by means of settlers rather than imposing its laws on others 
as the French did; the critique of despotic rule in the manner of Sallust, linked to 
the expansion of the private realm over the public (she quoted Burke on this point 
in her Origins); the concomitant infection of foreign policy with commercial 
imperatives; the corruption of Europeans in the colonies and production of 
characters like Rhodes who gave themselves over to the imperialism of ceaseless 
expansion; the clash between Roman plebs and elites transformed into the 
contemporary rule of the “mob” and crisis of the traditional political class; and, 
finally, again like Sallust, the dialectical observation that expansion produces its 
own negation in the auto-generation of a type of people—European savages and 
barbarians—who would subvert the polity from within.116 
Arendt’s recourse to the republican critique of imperialism is plainly 
evident. It allowed her to discern Europe’s cultural and political decay in its 
exploitative rule of non-Europeans as well as in “global, universally interrelated 
civilization.”117 At the same time, while non-European intellectuals challenged 
Western pieties, Arendt, Hobson, and their European predecessors did not 
question the legitimacy of European expansion so long as it accorded with certain 
precepts. Empire rather than imperialism was acceptable; indeed, it was a motor 
of civilizational progress. The cost for indigenous people was noted only in 
  
19 
 
  
 
asides. Thus Hobson confessed that settler colonialism was effectively tantamount 
to genocide, much as Arendt did half a century later: “When the settlement 
approaches the conditions of genuine colonisation, it has commonly implied the 
extermination of the lower races, either by war or by private slaughter, as in the 
case of the Australian Bushmen and the Hottentots, Red Indians, and the Marories 
[sic], or by forcing upon them the habits of a civilisation equally destructive of 
them.”118 And nonetheless, he—and Arendt—idealized settler colonialism. To be 
sure, many Victorians deplored such violence, urging inquiries and measures to 
“protect” the “natives.”119 One of them, John Stuart Mill, was so perturbed by the 
consequences for indigenous peoples that he worried colonization might be 
discredited altogether. In Duncan Bell’s apt term, the later Mill’s advocacy of 
colonialism became “melancholic.”120 These tensions are apparent in Arendt’s 
hotly contested views on a controversial settlement project in which she 
participated: the Zionist colonization of Palestine. Arendt’s ensemble of analyses 
served to frame both her early justifications and her later biting criticism of 
Zionism—a criticism, however, that was ultimately undermined by its 
civilizational normativity. 
 
SETTLING PALESTINE AND MELANCHOLIC ZIONISM   
A secular thinker, Arendt eschewed religious legitimation for Jewish settlement in 
Palestine. Nor did she have recourse to Zionist rhetoric of “returning” to the 
ancient homeland, and she consistently criticized Herzl’s territorial solution to the 
“Jewish question.” She seems to have regarded Jews foremost as a “European 
people” rather than as non-European Semites. For her, “Palestine can be regarded 
solely as an area of settlement for European Jews.”121 Strange as it may seem, it is 
likely that her Zionist inspiration was based more on the “marvelously colorful 
tales of the adventures of Aeneas and his fellow Trojans” than on “the aimless 
desperate wandering of the Israeli tribes in the desert after the Exodus.”122 
The Jewish right to the land, then, was based on the Roman ideal of 
settlers cultivating the soil. Reflecting the agriculturalist argument that productive 
land use gave property title—an argument advanced by her idol Martin Buber, for 
one—she declared that “the right of the Jewish people in Palestine is the same 
right every human being has to the fruits of his work.” Let us recall the centrality 
of work (homo faber) for Arendt. The lengthy worldlessness of Jews was a result 
of “the thousands-of-years-old separation of the Jewish people from cultivation of 
the soil,” a privation that “is bad, even inhuman (and the greatest achievement of 
the Palestinian yishuv is to have reversed this separation).”123 The problem was 
less exile than the interdiction of cultivation. She was thrilled by the colonization 
experiment that, if successful, would place a Jewish nation on an equal footing 
with other nations and mark the Jewish reentry into politics and world history. 
The right to this status, she reiterated in her essays in the early 1940s, lay in the 
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fact that “the work of their own hands make[s] this earth richer and more 
beautiful.” This was the “conquest of Palestine by hard work.” The “Jewish rights 
to Palestine,” she therefore declared, were “earned and founded on Jewish 
labor.”124 Such was her secularization of Buber’s mystical evocation of 
agricultural work as the vehicle for Jewish redemption in their ancestral 
homeland.125 
Likewise, her insistent demand for an autonomous Jewish army to fight 
Nazi Germany was based on the right of the settler-colonist: “the right to take up 
the sword, which can be denied to no one who has put his hand to the plow or 
trowel.” They would “defend the fruits of their labor and the meaning of their 
civilian life,” namely, “their fields and trees, their houses and factories, their 
children and wives.” She was anxious that the Zionist achievement be recognized 
as self-emancipation, not as the free gift of the imperial power—that is, as the 
product of Great Britain’s incorporation of the Balfour Declaration into its 
mandate trust of Palestine. Jewish political equality was attested by a really 
existing “community, for we are there ‘by rights and not just out of 
sufferance.’”126 
For their part, Arendt thought, the Arabs had neglected the task of 
cultivation and civilization: “the Arabs had 1,500 years to turn a stony desert into 
fertile land, whereas the Jews have had not even forty, and . . . the difference is 
quite remarkable”—a view that ignored the fact that the Zionist economy enjoyed 
insuperable comparative advantages. Its projects were often built on extant 
Ottoman and local Arab initiatives, Zionist industrial schemes were favored by an 
official concession regime, and, driving it all along, Jewish capital flowed in from 
around the world.127 Her descriptions of Arab society reflected her broader view 
of Asian stasis and despotism—of their countries as semi-feudal places ruled by 
clans and rich landlords who exploited a hapless peasantry.128 Although she never 
subscribed to the convenient fiction that Palestine was denuded of Arabs, and 
even conceded that the land “is not even entirely ours,”129 she did think that the 
Zionists’ economic development and establishment of political society there 
trumped the rights of the Arabs because they were not fully human in her sense. 
The Jews were doing the Arabs a favor: “In their blind ideological hostility 
toward Western civilization … they [the Arabs] could not see that this region 
would be modernized in any case and that it would be far wiser to form an 
alliance with the Jews.”130 Like the Greek colonists, the Jewish ones were 
founding a polis where none had existed. And like the Roman ones, they were 
cultivating the soil, which would benefit everyone.131 Jewish colonization would 
give Arabs the chance to “overcome feudal, backward conditions and terrible 
poverty.”132 Therein lay the right of colonization.  
As Mill did with regard to the British settler colonies, however, Arendt 
developed mixed feelings about the Zionist settlement in Palestine in the mid-
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1940s. The timing is significant. The period of incipient violent Zionist opposition 
to the British Mandate and the international Zionist assertion of rights to all of 
Palestine coincided with her work on Origins. It is little wonder, then, that she 
applied the same categories of analysis to Zionism as to politics and history 
generally. The objects of her criticism will now be familiar. Rather than 
establishing a federation or commonwealth with Arabs in Palestine and in the 
region, the Zionists were reverting to the integral nationalism she associated with 
Central European chauvinism. The key for Jewish flourishing, even survival, in 
the region would be a United Nations trusteeship that prevented a sovereign state 
and the absolute cultural claims she had observed in Europe a decade earlier: the 
choice was “federation or Balkanization.”133 Rather than incarnating the Virgilian 
ideal, with its mythic blending of settlers and locals to create a new polity, let 
alone one that respected difference in a superordinate structure, Zionists made 
little effort to integrate Palestinians into their new dynamic economy. Not that the 
Arabs welcomed the newcomers. Both sides were obtuse, she thought: “almost 
from the beginning, the misfortune of the building of a Jewish national home has 
been that it was accompanied by a Central European ideology of nationalism and 
tribal thinking among Jews, and by an Oxford-inspired colonial romanticism 
among the Arabs.”134 Ben Gurion’s support of laws that prevented intermarriage 
represented such ethnocentrism, she wrote later in Eichmann in Jerusalem.135  
Generally, Arendt sought to promote cosmopolitan openness in the face of 
what she called “dangerous tendencies of formerly oppressed people to shut 
themselves off from the rest of the world and develop nationalist superiority 
complexes of their own.”136 Zionists, she suggested, were making the same 
mistakes as newly liberated colonial peoples elsewhere in the world, no less than 
many Europeans before them—namely, permitting the nation to dominate the 
state. When the American Zionist Conference of October 1944 determined that “a 
free and democratic commonwealth … shall embrace the whole of Palestine, 
undivided and undiminished,” she noted with alarm that Arabs were left with “the 
choice between voluntary emigration or second-class citizenship.” The conference 
had betrayed her and the binational Zionists of Brit Shalom, who had “tirelessly 
preached the necessity of an understanding between the Arab and Jewish 
peoples.”137 Although Arendt had no sympathy with Arab resistance to Zionist 
colonization, she could not countenance in Palestine what she deplored in Central 
Europe, that is, ethnically exclusive nation-states that produced refugees and 
second-class citizens, as occurred in the Middle East in 1948.138 “After the War it 
turned out that the Jewish question, which was considered the only insoluble one, 
was indeed solved—namely, by means of a colonized and then conquered 
territory—but this solved neither the problem of the minorities nor the stateless. 
On the contrary, like virtually all other events of our century, the solution of the 
Jewish question merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby 
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increasing the number of stateless and rightless by another 700,000 to 800,000 
people.”139 
Rigorously consistent in her analysis, Arendt went further than drawing 
parallels between interwar European states and Zionism; she saw the latter 
tending towards totalitarianism itself. The population “transfer” thinking that 
subtended the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem was akin to “the 
decision of a totalitarian state, implemented by its particular brand of ruthless 
force.” She denounced the firm conviction that non-Jews were by nature 
predisposed to hate Jews—the theory of eternal antisemitism—as “plain racist 
chauvinism” that “does not differ from other master-race theories.” The Yishuv 
was being corrupted in its struggle with the British and the Palestinians by 
“terrorism and the growth of totalitarian methods [which] are silently tolerated 
and secretly applauded.”140 The cost of this approach would be high, she predicted 
in 1948: “The ‘victorious’ Jew would live surrounded by an entirely hostile Arab 
population, secluded inside ever-threatened borders, absorbed with physical self-
defence to a degree that would submerge all other interests and activities. … the 
Palestinian Jews would degenerate into one of those small warrior tribes about 
whose possibilities and importance history has amply informed us since the days 
of Sparta.”141 Her opposition to the development of political Zionism culminated 
in an open letter in the New York Times in late 1948, signed by such other 
luminaries as Albert Einstein and Sidney Hook, condemning the Revisionists for 
having “openly preached the doctrine of the fascist state.”142 Non-Jewish 
ethnocentrism had been bad for the Jews, she was saying, just as Jewish 
ethnocentrism was bad for Palestinians as well as for Jews.   
Arendt now engaged in closer scrutiny of this corruption’s source. From 
the outset, she realized, Theodor Herzl’s Zionism had been based too firmly in 
“German sources,” meaning that Jews were imagined as a “biological entity” or 
“organic national body” rather than foremost as a political one; here her views 
paralleled Buber’s advice to the Anglo-American Commission in 1946 that 
Zionism should not “create another national movement of the European type.”143 
Herzl was “a crackpot” who reflected the “deep desires of the folk” and 
extraparliamentary political movements, which put him in “touch with 
subterranean currents of history”; here was the language of destructive 
undercurrents in Western history she took from Goethe and used at the beginning 
of Origins. As a result, she concluded, political Zionism was “essentially a 
reactionary movement,” and the Yishuv was suffused by a “fierce chauvinism and 
fanatic provincialism.”144  
For that reason, she was unwilling to pay the “moral price” that her Zionist 
critics like the Israeli philosopher Elhanan Yakira claim are the inevitable cost of 
Zionism’s success.145 Establishing an ethnonational state could not justify ethnic 
cleansing, she suggested, because it was a reactionary enterprise; colonial 
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genocides could be justified, in contrast, when committed in the name of 
expanding civilization. And so, like Hans Kohn, she chose to base herself in the 
United States, the last bastion of freedom, rather than Israel, where the ideal of a 
federation or commonwealth of Jews and Arabs was being trumped by the 
sovereign nation-state on the interwar model that she thought an increasingly 
globalized world had rendered anachronistic.146  
For all these criticisms of Israel, however, she did not abandon this settler 
colonial experiment. The distinction she inherited between the positive imperial 
expansion of settler colonialism and negatively coded late nineteenth-century 
imperialism was never so evident as in her claim that “the building of a Jewish 
home was not a colonial enterprise in which Europeans came to exploit foreign 
riches with the help and at the expense of native labor.” The point about settler 
colonialism, though, is that the settler covets the land rather than native labor, a 
dynamic that Arendt knew had been fatal to indigenous people since Europe’s 
expansion in the fifteenth century.147 For her, Jews had transformed the land for 
the better—the progressive dimension of Zionism—“and this without conquest 
and with no attempt at extermination of the natives.” She thus heralded the 
“unique” Jewish achievements in Palestine, especially the Kibbutzim, which she 
called, again echoing Buber, “the most magnificent part of the Jewish 
homeland.”148 Later, in 1967, during her supposed anti-Zionist phase, she exulted 
in Israel’s victory over Arab forces, sharing the Israeli view of Nasser as a 
neofascist.149 The Roman categories of her thought simultaneously underwrote 
and mitigated the critique of Zionism, because the outcome ultimately justified 
the violence used to achieve it. Her Zionism was accordingly melancholic, like 
Mill’s ambivalent defense of colonialism, but it was Zionism all the same because 
it sufficiently resembled her ideal of civilizational expansion compared to the 
surrounding Arab states. However stinging her criticisms of Zionism-in-practice, 
she was not the anti- or post-Zionist that some have made her out to be.150 
 
THE HOLOCAUST AND REASON OF STATE 
How, then, does the Holocaust fit into her schema? Can the republican tradition 
be squared with the “new key” of post-Holocaust global civilization? The 
analytical task was to separate this previous imperial violence from Nazi 
genocidal imperialism. The Roman Empire had certainly committed excesses; 
Arendt often referred to its destruction of Carthage. Sometimes she even hinted at 
a connection between Roman and Nazi campaigns in the manner of Simone Weil. 
The “practical abolition” of “wars of annihilation” over the last hundred years, 
she thought, meant that their reappearance with totalitarianism was the “reversion 
of warfare to the days when the Romans wiped Carthage off the face of the 
earth.”151 On the whole, though, she lauded the Romans for replacing the Greek 
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mode of unlimited warfare with a political modality that ended hostilities with a 
treaty and alliance, “inventing a new outcome for war’s conflagration.”152  
What about Rome’s infamous destruction of Carthage? Peace was 
impossible with that city because its leaders were untrustworthy, thereby 
embodying “an anti-Roman political principle against which Roman 
statesmanship was powerless and which would have destroyed Rome had not 
Rome destroyed it first.” Carthage was also equally powerful and hardly likely to 
yield on Roman terms.153 Her analysis of the reasoning for Rome’s policy of 
destruction in the Third Punic War shows that it mirrored the logic of colonial and 
imperial wars of expansion that so often ended in genocidal counterinsurgency 
and indigenous destruction—namely, the conqueror cannot accept parity with a 
rival. Roman political virtues were predicated on submission to its rule. Those 
that declined these terms would be destroyed. Such were the limits of Rome’s 
vaunted toleration and pluralism. Cicero and Augustine may have concurred with 
this reasoning because of their partiality for Rome, but even they evinced greater 
unease at Carthage’s fate than did Arendt. It was accordingly understandable that 
she inclined toward Cato the Elder, the model citizen whose aphorisms she often 
quoted, and the instigator of Carthage’s destruction.154  
Plainly, she did not think wars of annihilation were unprecedented. They 
had characterized antiquity, had been tamed by the civilizing process of the West, 
and then reappeared with totalitarianism. What, then, was special about the 
Holocaust? Her only extensive discussion of this question in relation to the new 
genocide concept appears in Eichmann in Jerusalem. It is well known that she 
criticized Eichmann’s indictment for interpreting the Holocaust as “not much 
more than the most horrible pogrom in Jewish history,” instead of recognizing its 
unprecedented nature. Unprecedented, she insisted, was the Nazi regime’s 
determination that “the entire Jewish people disappear from the face of the earth.” 
This was a “new crime,” a crime “against the human status.” “Expulsion,” by 
contrast, was “an offense against fellow-nations”; genocide was “an attack on 
human diversity as such,” a statement that echoed the United Nations Declaration 
on Genocide in 1946, which was heavily influenced by Raphael Lemkin’s 
philosophy that the “human cosmos” was violated by the destruction of its 
constituent nations.155 This much is clear, but why did she insist that genocide 
was unprecedented when elsewhere she suggested it was not? Even if she 
qualified this statement by confining it to the modern era, was she suggesting that 
no genocides had taken place, for instance, in the colonial world since 1500? 
Arendt distinguished between the Holocaust and previous genocides by 
contending that the former was purely ideological while the latter were pragmatic.  
Whereas conventional genocides, so to speak, were limited by utilitarian aims like 
pacification or domination, and were to that extent explicable, the extermination 
of Jews was unlimited, running counter to the war effort by the diversion of 
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resources; it was therefore inexplicable.156 That is why she wrote that the 
Holocaust “could not be explained by any utilitarian purpose; Jews had been 
murdered all over Europe, not only in the East, and their annihilation was not due 
to any desire to gain territory that ‘could be used for colonization by 
Germans.’”157 
What Arendt meant by “utilitarian purpose” was apparent from her 
references to territorial gain and colonization, and also from her praise of the 
Jerusalem court for making an important distinction. On the one hand, states 
could suppress opposition, which resulted in “war crimes, such as shooting of 
partisans and killing of hostages” and even ethnic cleansing and destruction “of 
native populations to permit colonization by an invader.” These were a “known, 
though criminal, purpose,” a telling slippage about the transgressive nature of 
imperial expansion through the ages on which she did not elaborate. Indeed, she 
had noted that “massacres of whole peoples are not unprecedented. They were the 
order of the day in antiquity, and the centuries of colonization and imperialism 
provide plenty of examples of more or less successful attempts of that sort.”158  
On the other hand, the extermination of the Jews was a “‘crime against 
humanity’, whose intent and purpose were unprecedented.”  Unprecedented too, 
she implied, was the nature of the regime that prevented Eichmann from judging 
his own actions by civilized standards. Eichmann and other Nazi criminals were 
committing crimes “under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for 
him to know or feel that he is doing wrong.” The context was unique, because the 
motives for the Holocaust could not be read from Eichmann’s subjective 
intentions. While his evil was banal, the Holocaust was a manifestation of radical 
evil that issued from a supraindividual process of limitless expansion whose 
executors were people like Eichmann.159 For Arendt, “the unprecedented crime of 
genocide in the midst of Occidental civilization” applied only to the Holocaust.160 
Genocide outside Occidental civilization—the West—was not so shocking. 
Consequently, she objected in particular to the penchant of historians to “draw 
analogies” between Hitler and other notorious figures in history. “The point is that 
Hitler was not like Jenghiz Khan and not worse than some other great criminal but 
entirely different. The unprecedented is neither the murder itself nor the numbers 
of victims and not even ‘the number of persons who united to perpetrate them.’ It 
is much rather the ideological nonsense which causes them, the mechanization of 
their execution, and the careful and calculated establishment of a world of the 
dying in which nothing any longer made sense.”161 Totalitarianism was a wholly 
new phenomenon and should not be confused with previous regime forms and 
their crimes:  
For the moral point of this matter is never reached by 
calling what happened by the name of “genocide” or by 
counting the many millions of victims: extermination of 
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whole peoples had happened in antiquity, as well as in 
modern colonization. It is reached only when we realize 
that this happened within the frame of a legal order and that 
the cornerstone of this “new law” consisted of the 
command “Thou shalt kill,” not thy enemy but innocent 
people who were not even potentially dangerous, and not 
for any reason of necessity but, on the contrary, even 
against all military and other utilitarian considerations.162 
To make her point, Arendt tested Eichmann’s claim that German actions 
could be understood in terms of a realpolitische state of emergency, the rule of 
raison d’état that originated with Roman thinkers like Cicero and Tacitus.163 She 
may have known that Hitler also availed himself of reason of state (Staatsraison), 
and the German historian Friedrich Meinecke linked it to the Nazis as well.164 
Arendt’s immersion in the tradition provided her with the tools she needed to 
make the necessary distinctions. Two sorts of reasons of state could be 
distinguished: a ruthless one that would break treaties and commit excesses when 
expeditious, commonly identified with Tacitus and later with Machiavelli,165 and 
a milder version, sourced in Cicero, that was taken up by later thinkers whom 
Arendt admired, like Augustine and, later, Edmund Burke. Here, the operative 
principle was necessity rather than expediency. The reasons for action needed to 
be universally recognizable, could not become a regular principle of government, 
and needed to eschew “infamy.”166 
In keeping with this tradition, she noted that “concessions [can be] made 
to the stringencies of Realpolitik, in order to preserve power and thus assure the 
continuance of the existing legal order as a whole.” Such crimes, she conceded, 
were exempt from legal redress, “because the existence of the state itself is at 
stake, and no outside political entity has the right to deny a state its existence or 
prescribe how it is to preserve it.”167 This argument did not apply to Eichmann, 
she continued, when a state like the Nazi regime “is founded on criminal 
principles.” Here she was also applying the test of the German Social Democrat 
and legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch, who in 1946 famously argued, following 
Cicero and Augustine, that laws that were intolerably and deliberately unjust 
could not be regarded as legal.168 “Can we apply the same principle,” Arendt 
asked, “that is applied to a governmental apparatus in which crime and violence 
are exceptions and borderline cases to a political order in which crime is legal and 
the rule”?169 
This defense of the softer version of Staatsraison meant the legitimizing 
of genocide against indigenous peoples, who were usually legally classified as 
rebels and therefore not protected by the laws of war. It was thus the subtle 
distinctions contained within the republican tradition of reason of state that 
enabled Arendt to distinguish between the Holocaust and genocides that occurred 
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in the colonies. As we have seen, Arendt was not especially interested in this 
aspect of settler societies, the form of colonialism she praised consistently in her 
writings, because the English colonists, in particular, established political 
societies to her liking.170 It is for this reason, perhaps, that she does not mention 
Rome’s laying waste of the rebellious Numantia on the Iberian peninsular in 133 
BC or the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AD, which Lemkin cited as a case of 
genocide.171 Arendt limited the Roman way of warfare to interstate conflicts, 
occluding colonial and civil wars and thereby licensing reason of state for 
republican state building and consolidation.172  
 
CONCLUSION 
It may be argued against my contention about Arendt’s revival of Roman and 
republican traditions that, following Heidegger, she thought Western history had 
imploded and that little could be salvaged from the past. After all, she wrote in 
her Origins that “We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past 
and simply call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead 
load which by itself time will bury in oblivion.”173 Those stark words, written in 
the pessimistic year of 1950, complement her wish for human dignity to be 
guaranteed by “a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity 
this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain 
strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.”174 
Later, in 1969, she would express her commitment, nurtured since her affiliation 
with the antifascist resistance, to spontaneously assembled councils that emerged 
in revolutionary conjunctures and to the federation of such assemblies in larger 
units through treaties and compacts that would make for a “new state concept.”175 
As we now know, this is precisely how she came to conceptualize the Roman 
Empire; strange as it may seem, she was arguing that they expressed the same 
political principle. When she wrote Origins in the 1940s, she seemed only 
vaguely conscious of this heritage, although even then she deployed classic 
republican tropes in her analysis.176  
Arendt’s anxiety about the totalitarian threat led her to North America and 
then to recall, honor, and learn from Rome more explicitly; in that sense, she 
became a “neo-Roman” thinker (Quentin Skinner).177 For all that, she did not 
think her new home was Rome anew, let alone a new Rome, as she phrased the 
distinction between taking up “the thread of continuity which bound Occidental 
politics back to the foundation of the eternal city,” on the one hand, and “the 
foundation of a new body politic,” on the other.178 That imperial-republican polity 
could be neither revived nor even emulated in modern conditions: “The dominion 
of the Roman Empire over the civilized and barbarian parts of the world was only 
bearable because it stood against the dark and frightening background of 
unknown parts of the earth.”179 Rome offered “no solution to our present political 
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problems,” namely, politics in a new key: the product of a globally interconnected 
world in which the humanly created but uncontrollable economic processes 
determined the fate of nations and peoples, rendering them worldless.180 
Modernity’s rupture of Rome’s political traditions meant one had to think 
“without banisters”: it was impossible, she therefore determined, to “stabilize the 
situation in which we have been since the seventeenth century in any final 
way”—echoing Voegelin’s reasoning about why das römische Gespräch had 
commenced in the first place.181 What remained of the Roman legacy was the 
ancient ideal of federations as in a united Europe of nation-states: a “federal 
system, whose advantage is that power moves neither from above nor below, but 
is horizontally directed so that the federated units mutually check and control their 
powers.”182 This ideal was one of “the rich and the strange, the pearls and coral in 
the depths” of the ocean floor that she carried to the surface.183 
 Progressive as it sounds, this ideal remained underwritten by considerable 
Eurocentrism. Arendt regarded European decolonization, for example, less as the 
truculent and at times desperately resisted strategic withdrawal from imperial 
possessions than as a voluntary relinquishment that indicated the victory of 
republicanism over the transnational movements of racism and imperialism. “It is 
one of the glories of Europe, and especially of Great Britain,” she wrote 
breathlessly, “that she preferred to liquidate the empire.”184 The West—now 
effectively the United States and the remnants of the British Empire—had not 
succumbed to totalitarianism, unlike Germany and Russia. “The fear of 
boomerang effects of imperialism upon the mother country,” she declared 
optimistically in 1958 during Great Britain’s brutal suppression of the “Mau 
Mau” uprising in Kenya, “remained strong enough to make the national 
parliaments a bulwark of justice for the oppressed people and against the colonial 
administration,” although in fact the British—and the French—did their level best 
to prevent the application of the Geneva Conventions in these colonial 
conflicts.185 Her point was that their counterinsurgency did not escalate to 
Auschwitz-style proportions, however dirty these wars, and for this reason she 
had no truck with the anticolonial, national liberation movements of Africa and 
Asia, least of all for their European supporters like Sartre.186  
The praise Arendt lavished on the council movements in Hungary in 1956, 
which arose to resist Soviet imperialist totalitarianism, was thus not extended to 
anticolonial movements of the same period that were of course seeking national 
liberation from the comparatively liberal empires of the West. It should not be 
forgotten, she reminded those seeking to escape empire, that the West’s powerful 
domestic institutions had resisted genocidal tendencies in its colonies for the good 
of all. “It is to the salutary restraining of these institutions that we owe those 
benefits which, after all and despite everything, the non-European peoples have 
been able to derive from Western domination.”187 Non-European peoples needed 
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to appreciate these Western virtues, including the nature of authority, she 
suggested.  
Not (yet) political beings, Africans and Asians embodied an alterity that 
challenged Arendt’s conception and defense of human pluralism.188 This 
prejudice was also evident in her dismissal “of traditional Oriental despotism, in 
India and China,” and the proposition that non-Roman imperial formations could 
preserve the pluralism she so cherished. As Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper 
have recently shown, however, those other empires accommodated difference as 
well, only differently.189 What is more, Arendt’s view of the Roman Empire as a 
limited polity deploying commensurately limited violence is hard to reconcile 
with Rome’s own self-understanding as potentially encompassing “the orbis 
terrarium.”190 After all, what she admired about Rome’s theoretically limitless 
expansion was the extension of civilization to the barbarous. 
Arendt’s blindness to her blindness in this regard was evident in her belief, 
noted above, that settler societies like the United States successfully harmonized 
immigrant nationalities in a tolerant polity. Whether in the racist immigration 
restrictions of Australia’s “White Australia Policy” and analogous policies in 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States or in the biopolitical disciplining of 
minority populations, however, the imperative to exclude and homogenize in the 
first half of the twentieth century is difficult to gainsay.191 What is more, the 
American republican liberty she prized was not only predicated on the 
dispossession and genocide of Native Americans, but also on the slavery of 
Africans that prevented the destabilizing presence of a large poor white 
population.192 No doubt, Arendt’s optimism was conditioned by her Central 
European experiences and understandable hostility to the prevalent ethnonational 
conception of politics at the time. Even so, in view of her similar hostility to the 
civil rights activism of African-Americans, no less than to contemporaneous 
anticolonial movements, it seems difficult to seek her guidance about 
statelessness, refugees, human rights, and republican foundations with the 
confidence we see in recent publications.193 For rather than positing “the political” 
as a domain in which the right to participate can be claimed and contested, she 
ascribed nonpolitical status to entire categories of humans—indigenous peoples, 
those engaging in animal laborans, and others reduced to “bare life”—who were 
thereby excluded from civilization and its emoluments.194   
If Arendt’s vaunted cosmopolitanism was less universalist than commonly 
supposed, her Eurocentrism was also revealed by her intuitively emotional 
reaction to the first news of Auschwitz. “Decisive” was not “1933” but “1943,” as 
she put it when hearing credible information about the death camps. “Something 
happened there to which we cannot reconcile ourselves,” she told her interviewer 
Günter Gaus about the experience. “[T]he method, the fabrication of corpses, and 
so on,” was radically new. “Personally, I could accept everything else.”195 To 
confront the historical realm of “real evil” as opposed to the literary and 
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philosophical realm of “radical evil,” she concluded, led to “speechless horror, 
when all you can say is: This should never have happened.”196 What occurred in 
the decade after 1933 was explicable, even acceptable. 
Arendt was not alone in her reaction. George Steiner, for his part, wrote 
that his “own consciousness is possessed by the eruption of barbarism in Europe,” 
which “did not spring up in the Gobi desert or the rain forests of the Amazon,” 
although he disclaimed “for this hideousness any singular privilege.”197 The 
problem, though, is the coding of totalitarian violence and especially the 
Holocaust as “the eruption of barbarism in Europe”—that traditional republican 
civilizational category which subtended the extermination of native peoples and 
imperial wars over millennia. Arendt, Steiner and others, it seems, were not 
shocked by barbarism outside Europe, whether ascribable to Europeans or non-
Europeans: it was the historical norm that constituted European and generally 
Western hegemony. Shocking was the genocide of Europeans and of course their 
own persons, family, and friends. Here was the claim for the Holocaust as 
civilizational rupture (Zivilisationsbruch) decades before German-Israeli historian 
Dan Diner made it the cornerstone of his philosophy of history.198 This contention 
has become a commonplace in Holocaust studies and is the basis for 
contemporary secular temporality, implying that only with the Holocaust of 
European Jewry did state and ethnic violence radically transgress the tissue of 
human solidarity to such an extent that henceforth its commemoration was 
necessary for the moral bearings of Western civilization.199 Far from proposing a 
continuity or “boomerang” thesis regarding colonialism and the metropole, as 
commonly supposed, Arendt intended to show discontinuity between what she 
called “the Western tradition”—ultimately a settler colonial one—and totalitarian 
crimes, which she ascribed in part to modern imperialist conquest. In this way, the 
Holocaust functioned as a screen memory that blocked from view the 
civilizational, indeed racial hierarchies on which the republican edifice was based. 
As we know from the deliberations about the United Nations Genocide 
Convention three years after her 1943 experience, that which “shocks the 
conscience of mankind”—to use the phrase from the UN General Assembly 
declaration on genocide—is highly political: what is experienced as transgressive, 
or especially transgressive, depends very much on who you are. Others have been 
outraged by previous events or processes, like the Atlantic slave trade.200 They did 
not accept Arendt’s “everything else”: the everything else was also a problem. 
Arendt’s republicanism and reaction to the Holocaust bears out Aimé Césaire’s 
observation that Europeans were only shocked by Nazism because they were 
treated as European imperialists had treated non-Europeans for centuries.201 She 
had little time for such anticolonial critics of Europe, but I have not been able to 
discern in her work an answer to Fanon’s accusation that “[t]he West saw itself as 
a spiritual adventure. It is in the name of the spirit, in the name of the spirit of 
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Europe, that Europe has made her encroachments, that she has justified her crimes 
and legitimized the slavery in which she holds four-fifths of humanity.”202 There 
is no obligation to agree with Fanon and Césaire, but their critique deserves a 
fuller response than it has received so far.203  
In demonstrating these implications of Arendt’s thought for the republican 
tradition, my aim is not to debunk an iconic thinker by again highlighting her 
well-known deprecating observations about Africans and African-Americans.204 
Neither is it to comfort those who condemn her for supposedly betraying Jews 
and Israel in Eichmann in Jerusalem or for consorting with the enemy, Martin 
Heidegger.205 Still less do her critics get to the heart of the matter when they 
accuse Arendt of exculpating German culture from complicity with Nazism by 
displacing such responsibility onto abstract modernity.206 In fact, like many of her 
Zionist opponents, she thought that the “Western tradition” was not the cause of 
totalitarianism but the antidote. My aim, rather, is to draw attention to the limits 
of das römische Gespräch today.  
They are all too evident in the persistence of imperial wars waged in the 
name of humanity and international law, wars that violate the late 
Enlightenment’s “Commonwealthman” ideals of transnational political federation 
without colonial domination that the United Nations is supposed to embody.207 
Although Arendt was drawn to these ideals, consistent as they were with the 
United States’s formerly anti-imperial self-understanding, she ultimately sided 
with the Rome that could not tolerate “some other absolutely different entity equal 
to Rome in greatness.” This intolerance to parity sounds eerily familiar, as does 
Rome’s invocation of other countries’ violation of the law of nations as a reason 
to invade, occupy, and modernize, irrespective of the “collateral damage.” No 
price, it seems, can be too high in bringing peace and civilization to those dark 
corners of the globe; or, rather, not much attention is devoted to the price in the 
grand scheme of civilizational expansion, whether for Hobson, Arendt, or their 
latter-day epigones. 
To be sure, as the Cold War drew the United States into the Vietnam War, 
Arendt descried the corrupting affects on the North American polity in familiar 
republican terms: the “boomerang effect” was undermining the polity’s precious 
foundation that she had celebrated in On Revolution. This critique of the country’s 
Vietnam adventure certainly came rather late in the day—in the 1970s—long after 
others had sounded the tocsin about the country’s imperiled institutions, let alone 
the millions who had perished in South East Asia.208 In the end, the critical 
potential of das römische Gespräch was mitigated by the supervening 
commitment to the tradition’s existence when it was perceived as threatened. 
Because it can only offer critique from the position of hegemony, then, it is 
ultimately a weak language of dissent or opposition.  
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Accordingly, despite Arendt’s use of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness 
to depict European rule in Africa in her Origins, she could not follow his 
relativization of the civilizational ideal when he has Marlow in London pondering 
how the Romans viewed the savagery of the ancient Britons. Neither did she 
subscribe to her friend Walter Benjamin’s thesis about the dialectical relationship 
between civilization and violence. “There is no document of civilization that is 
not simultaneously a document of barbarism,” he wrote in an over-cited aphorism 
that also mentions Carthage’s destruction. Nor did she follow him in empathizing 
with the victims rather than the victors of history, though she edited and 
introduced his text in its English translation.209 Arendt’s close reading of Kant did 
not lead her to share the criticisms of imperial conquest he expressed in his 
Perpetual Peace, with its ironic invocation of civilization and suggestion that 
Europeans’ modernity made them the more efficient barbarians.210 While Arendt 
would trace the West’s decline, she was unable to conceive of its fall, because it 
represented humanity’s last hope.   
Apprehension about the Sallustian and Machiavellian explanations for the 
decline and fall of empire—the experience of freedom leading inevitably to 
expansion and then corruption, especially when all rivals have been vanquished—
has typified worried imperialists since Vietnam. In 1986, the sociologist Lewis S. 
Feuer, exasperated with neo-Marxist critiques of empire, published Imperialism 
and the Anti–Imperialist Mind, which began with the apocalyptic observation that 
“Whether Western civilization has entered upon a declining phrase, whether a 
mood of anti-civilization is spreading, such as that which marked the decay of the 
Roman Empire, is the question that most haunts political philosophers today.”211 
Like Arendt and Strauss before him, Feuer distinguished between civilized and 
barbaric empires (he used the terms progressive and regressive), a categorization 
he mapped onto the Cold War rivalry between the American and Soviet empires.  
The Soviet collapse a few years later led conservative commentators in 
particular to speak hubristically of American empire in terms of Rome and 
Britain. “People are now coming out of the closet on the word ‘empire’,” exulted 
columnist Charles Krauthammer in 2001: “The fact is no country has been as 
dominant culturally, economically, technologically and militarily in the history of 
the world since the Roman Empire.”212 Other journalists could not resist the 
analogical temptation either. Robert Kaplan drew on imperial history, including 
Rome’s Second Punic War with Carthage, from which to draw inspiring lessons 
about “warrior politics” and the “pagan ethos,” while Cullen Murphy asked 
outright, Are We Rome?213 Max Boot advanced “The Case for American Empire” 
and invoked Kipling, evidently without irony, in his book The Savage Wars of 
Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power.214 Even critics talk of the 
United States as “a new Rome.”215 The salience of the republican distinction, 
transmitted by Arendt, between good empire and bad imperialism is reproduced 
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now as then. Thus the historian Thomas Madden identified the United States with 
Rome as “empires of trust” based on informal systems of alliances and devoid of 
excess—a revival of the defensive imperialism thesis—which he distinguished 
from empires of conquest or commerce.216  
Can naked power and the emoluments of civilization be so neatly 
separated? Not according to Robert Kagan, a foreign policy commentator at the 
Brookings Institution. The latest participant in das römische Gespräch, he has 
written a much-discussed encomium for US global power that presents a 
frightening scenario: “The downfall of the Roman Empire brought an end not just 
to Roman rule but to Roman government and law and to an entire economic 
system stretching from Northern Europe to North Africa,” he reminded readers of 
the Wall Street Journal. “Culture, the arts, even progress in science and 
technology, were set back for centuries.” The same fate portends today if 
American empire declines and falls. Accordingly, he urges that the United States 
should embrace its global mission and relinquish the bashfulness of defensive 
imperialism, for its hegemony benefits all.217 Gone is the caution of a George 
Kennan who worried that an American attempt to impose institutions on other 
countries in a bipolar world would eventually undermine its own.218 
Despite the contemporary invocation of Arendt’s life and work to confront 
such imperial hubris, her alternative of extolling the virtues of benign empire and 
Western civilization seems inadequate, indeed impotent, because it shares too 
many basic assumptions about western hegemony with Kagan and his ilk.219 
Worse still, das römische Gespräch, now in the new key of a globalized world, 
serves at once to heighten anxiety about possible decline and then to drive 
expansion for empire’s permanent security, thereby incarnating the very tendency 
to limitlessness and uniformity that Arendt deplored. If we are living in “dark 
times,” it may be necessary to rethink the categories of our enlightenment. 
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